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Introduction
Across the spectrum of operations that 
involve civilian and military interactions, 
from disaster relief to conflict prevention 
to post-conflict reconstruction, information 
is power. ‘Information,’ noted British Red 
Cross senior media officer Sharon Reader 
in the midst of the response to the 2010 
Haiti earthquake, ‘can be as important as 
food and water’ (Magee 2010). ICT supports 
goals that range from health care delivery, to 
employment (and reducing the cost of doing 
business), to fostering better state-society 
relations (Wentz et al 2008). In the recent 
generation of relief and stability operations, 
information and communication technol-
ogy (ICT) systems are increasingly central to 
both strategy and operations. ICT systems—
hardware, software and networks—enable 
sensing, storing, computing, visualizing, 
modeling, navigating and communicating of 
various types of information:
•	 Socio-cultural information, which informs 
analysis of underlying and proximate 
causes of conflict, key leaders, and pos-
sible paths to stability;
•	 Geographic data facilitates assessment, 
logistics, and navigation;
•	 Visual representation of information in 
graphical forms, which enables practi-
tioners to share a common operating 
picture of the environment; 
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Civilian and military participants in relief and stability operations rely upon Information and 
Communications Technology (ICT) to collect, analyze, store, display, and share information 
that is critical for these civil-military interactions. This article investigates ICT innovation 
in these operations over time. As researchers in the sociology of technology school might 
predict, ICT innovation for relief and stability operations emerges in a distributed fashion, 
within clusters of specialty expertise that migrate across interconnected technology sys-
tems and across humanitarian and military activities. Major events such as natural disasters 
have punctuated the development of ICT for civil-military interactions, often driving com-
munity learning and coherence. Among the many stakeholders in the United States, the 
federal government in particular has played an important role in shaping the ICT ecosystem 
through policies and engagements. Government policies and changes in the field of action 
in the 1990s created imperatives for the US military in particular to collaborate with civil-
ian agencies on ICT innovation. Civil-military information sharing gaps persist today due, in 
part, to institutional factors. 
Guttieri: Governance, Innovation, and Information and Communications 
Technology for Civil-Military Interactions
Art. 6, page 2 of 16
Information sharing made possible by new 
or improved ICT systems is vital to coordi-
nation and deconfliction of the many civil-
ian and military agencies now active in con-
flict prevention and response to disaster, 
both natural and man-made. Components 
of these systems include laptop computers, 
personal digital assistants (PDAs), communi-
cation radios, cell phones and cellular net-
works (including WiFi access to Internet and 
phone service), satellite systems for Internet 
or telephone service, Global Positioning Sys-
tem (GPS) receivers, Geospatial Information 
System (GIS) and other mapping tools, col-
laboration software linked with or without 
wires, video conferencing, and VoIP over the 
Internet and other Internet Protocol (IP) net-
works, websites and portals. Deployable ICT 
packages for commercial satellite commu-
nication and turn-key Internet or informa-
tion services are now available from several 
companies and non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs) (Wentz 2006). United Nations 
(UN) agencies manage their own information 
networks, as do formal military alliances.1 ICT 
technologies are ubiquitous and ‘democratiz-
ing,’ in that they are available to and likely 
to be employed by both military and civilian 
personnel (Mancini 2013).
Until very recently, to talk about ICT inno-
vation was to focus on exclusive government 
proprietary technologies, often developed 
under secrecy protocols, that later spawned 
commercially-available technologies. In 
recent years, this view has become increas-
ingly obsolete. Many technologies that were 
once exclusive to military and other govern-
ment agencies, such as satellite imagery and 
geographic positioning, are now widely avail-
able (Jones 2002). Moreover, changes in state 
procurement policies have shifted much of 
the innovation in these realms to the civilian 
sector. The implications of this ‘open innova-
tion’ era of technology competence, provi-
sion, and governance include a number of 
unintended consequences. 
In the following sections, I treat ICT inno-
vation in relief and stability operations as 
a social construct, brought about by both 
official government actions and those of 
a community of ‘tech volunteers’ interact-
ing with the state, and one another. In the 
ecosystem of complex relief and stability 
operations, military operators, government 
bureaucrats, international agencies, private 
industry, and non-profits including this vol-
untary tech community cross-pollinate ideas, 
artifacts, and applications; together, these 
efforts provide the raw materials for the 
eventual agreement on technical standards. 
This community also tends to take action in 
response to crises, although many members 
do so without differentiating between the 
various origins of crisis (e.g. war vs. natural 
disaster). In short, the story of ICT innovation 
for complex operations is one of innovation 
distributed across interconnected systems 
and realms of activity. Major events such as 
natural disasters punctuate this story, often 
compelling the evolution of community 
learning and coherence. Finally, state actors 
across the federal government grapple today 
with an expanded and changing operating 
environment. The US military Civil Affairs 
approach to Civil Information Management 
seeks a balance of insulation from and open-
ness to the fluctuations in the civilian realm. 
In short, they aim to seize opportunities pro-
vided by ICT, while minimizing the hazards.
Innovation
Prior research on innovation is relevant to 
understanding the emergence of relief and 
stability operations ICT innovation, and the 
particular role of the state in it. Academic lit-
erature traditionally depicts innovation as an 
‘idea, practice, or object perceived as new by 
an individual or other unit of adoption’ (Rog-
ers 2003). But the arc of innovation studies 
has broadly shifted from a popular focus 
on invention or ‘new to the world’ to a view 
of innovation as both novel and impactful. 
Current innovation studies recognize that 
beyond invention of new artifacts like the 
QWERTY keyboard or the metric system, inno-
vation involves a social process that becomes 
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widely adopted, creating various impacts in 
that process. This view has developed across 
many disciplines and policy realms. 
In the 1980s, scholars from several disci-
plines came together over interest in inno-
vation in large and interdependent systems. 
Academic literature traditionally depicted 
technology as an exogenous driver of 
change. The ‘sociology of technology’ school, 
by contrast, depicted technological forms 
themselves as outcomes of social processes. 
These scholars highlighted how institutional, 
political and cultural factors helped dictate 
the shape of technology, calling attention 
not only to ‘diffusion,’ but to the broader 
mechanisms by which diffusion occurs. For 
example, in a landmark comparative national 
study of electrification between 1880 and 
1930, Thomas Hughes (1983) broadened 
the lens of the history of technology to take 
in a wider process of the evolution of large 
distributed technology systems. Hughes saw 
technology as a system made up of both 
artifacts (in his case, generators, relays and 
lamps), and social structures (incumbent 
technologies and actors, social needs and 
geographic distribution). Hughes found that 
social factors proved more consequential 
in the development of electrical grids than 
mechanical or scientific factors. Variation 
across national systems in key architectures 
for grid components and the national tradi-
tional ‘style’ for engineer training accounted 
for variations in the forms of ‘electrical power.’ 
Hughes focused on the work of ‘system build-
ers,’ the changing array of actors that pro-
vided impetus, expertise, and implementa-
tion across five moments that characterize 
large-scale technological systems: invention, 
development, innovation, technology trans-
fer, and commercialization. 
A key question for innovation researchers 
is how innovation spreads within and across 
organizations (Lundblad 2003). Innovation 
is a social process; in many cases, highly net-
worked individuals perform a key role in dif-
fusion (Hajek et al 2011). Users develop stand-
ards that decrease friction across systems 
(Constant 1980). During experiments, users 
notice variance and develop new consensus 
for policy and practical action. In this way, 
‘a wide range of actors comes to a locally 
enforceable agreement that certain social/
technical relations are appropriate and work-
able’ (Law 2012: 127). 
Three models for thinking about techno-
logical innovation (Constant II 1987) center 
upon what is to be explained. The first, a 
community of practice model, is useful to 
explain technological development and 
revolution. In this model, well-defined com-
munities, often composed of practitioners 
with diverse disciplinary training, are con-
cerned with functional failure. The second 
model focuses on organizations, replete with 
economic and bureaucratic imperatives for 
entrepreneurship, economic and organiza-
tional growth. The third model, a systems 
perspective, embraces the other two in order 
to understand the development of large-
scale sociotechnical systems.2 This systems 
approach offers a broad view of innovation 
that re-engages wider societal dynamics and 
forces beyond the immediate development 
of the technology. 
In a critique, Langdon Winner (1980, 1993) 
noted that many technological advances are 
artifacts of power, arising from the needs of 
privileged social groups. Winner cautioned 
against neglecting politics, a recurring theme 
in technology innovation studies. The social 
function of ICT innovation in stability opera-
tions, as we see below, shifts over time with 
politics, in particular, changes in the US (and 
global) paradigm of stability operations and 
peace building that redefined the roles of 
civilian and military actors in these missions.
ICT Innovation and the State
States shape innovation, as demonstrated 
by a comparative study of the Information 
Technology (IT) industry by Daniel Breznitz 
(2007). Specifically, state power is often 
needed to address market failures in expen-
sive and high-risk industrial research and 
development. The state also plays a role 
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facilitating the ‘inherently collective’ nature 
of the innovation process itself: ‘Innovation is 
iterative and cooperative in nature,’ Breznitz 
writes; ‘Therefore, there is a significant role 
for public actors in facilitating, enhancing, 
and maintaining innovative activities’ (2007: 
191). Among the many contributors to ICT 
innovation for relief and stability operations, 
the US Government, given its presence and 
tremendous market power, plays an outsized 
role. From the earliest days of ICT develop-
ment, US Government policy and actions rec-
ognized its advantages of advanced systems 
for both peace and war. To illustrate, in 1995, 
American diplomats chose Wright-Patterson 
Air Base in Dayton Ohio as the site for talks 
with Parties to end war in Bosnia. In the ‘Nin-
tendo’ room, the Americans displayed to del-
egates a real-time, three-dimensional map of 
the disputed territory. They sought to graphi-
cally represent ‘Total information, which for 
many today means total power’(Gray 1997: 
19). At that time, the US military dominated 
the information technology space, thanks in 
part to Cold War US government investment 
in the ICT sector and in academic research, 
and with close ties with leading firms and 
R&D capacity.
For decades, the US government internally 
supported the development of ICT, particu-
larly those with military applications. The 
1990s marked a significant shift in the state’s 
role, both in the development of ICT and its 
use in the field. 
The US federal government role in ICT 
innovation shifted functionally and norma-
tively in a single generation from ‘spin off’ 
from the government to the private sector, 
to ‘spin in’ from the private sector to govern-
ment (Guttieri 2000). Soon after, the Penta-
gon–by far the most powerful government 
actor in this field–developed a new concep-
tion of stability operations. It emphasized 
the need for civil-military collaboration for 
stability operations, which were defined as 
efforts ‘to maintain or reestablish a safe and 
secure environment, provide essential gov-
ernment services, emergency infrastructure 
reconstruction, and humanitarian relief ’ (US 
Department of Defense Under Secretary of 
Defense for Policy 2009). Today there are 
many more relevant players in the informa-
tion technology ecosystem, due in part to 
US government policy changes since the end 
of the Cold War. These changes, described 
below, shifted the locus and form of inven-
tion, development, innovation, tech transfer, 
and commercialization, including the link-
ages and forms of this division of labor.
Spin-off to Spin-in
US Department of Defense requirements are 
a major driver in almost any industry military 
procurement touches. Many scholars have 
traced the evolution of federal-commercial 
linkages in changing rules of procurement 
(Leslie 1992). Throughout the Cold War 
against the Soviet Union, the United States 
expended considerable resources toward 
largely secretive technological innovation. 
Science, linked to war forever by the devel-
opment of the atomic bomb, had become ‘a 
ward of the state’ (Leslie 1992: 199). Presi-
dent Dwight D. Eisenhower played a part in 
establishing organizations for military, indus-
trial and academic/scientific cooperation 
about which he would later, famously, warn 
the American public in his well-known com-
ments on the ‘military-industrial complex’ 
(Melman 1974: 263).3 These were also social 
networks among industry, academia and the 
military. Government agencies such as the 
National Science Foundation and the Office 
of Naval Research offered sizable contracts 
for research. The most often cited of the Cold 
War innovations was the Advanced Research 
Projects Agency (ARPA) (later named the 
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA). ARPA was established in the 1960s 
to organize interdisciplinary work in mate-
rials science research at major universities 
(Barber 1975).4 ARPANET, a network of four 
computer nodes established in 1969, formed 
part of the critical foundational infrastruc-
ture for the Internet (National Science Board 
1998: 8–6).5 The Cold War era brought many 
‘scientific artifacts’ such as the electronics, 
guidance systems, structural engineering 
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and manufacturing technologies that 
revolved around the intercontinental ballis-
tic missile (Leslie 1992: 208). In some cases, 
high-end government procurement dollars 
lured manufacturers away from lower end, 
more competitive, products (Noble 2011). 
The overall impact of US government promo-
tion of information technology, mechanical 
engineering and materials research was a 
period of commercial success, with ‘spin-off’ 
of technology from government research by 
NASA, the Department of Energy and the 
Department of Defense building a robust 
generation of commercial firms. 
It is no coincidence that high technology 
bastions like Silicon Valley in California and 
the Massachusetts Miracle along Route 128 
include Stanford University and MIT, benefi-
ciaries of the former ‘Gunbelt’ of federal mili-
tary funding for research. Many researchers 
went into business for themselves and hired 
former students to run their new labs, spin-
ning off dozens of new companies (Saxenian 
1994; Siegel and Markoff 1985; Blank 2008).6 
In sum, much of the story of US technologi-
cal innovations is about the role of the state 
establishing linkages across the civil and 
military realms. Many government-funded 
technological developments supported both 
warfighting and non-warfighting operations. 
The US Department of Defense is consist-
ently the largest single US government inves-
tor in research and development, investing 
about $65 billion in FY 2013, not counting 
the Department of Energy spending (Houri-
han 2013: 25). Direct production is not the 
only tool available for the state to spur inno-
vative new technologies. The state can also 
regulate industry, or signal entrepreneurs 
to move into a desirable area. The extent of 
government intervention to promote a field 
such as ICT may be less significant than the 
type of intervention selected (Evans et al 
1985). Policy shapes the relationships, and 
politics, among the participants in the inno-
vation realm.
Procurement and government research are 
vulnerable to budget cuts as a general rule 
(Plumer 2013). Historically, US government 
funding for technological innovation of all 
sorts, including ICT, has experienced both 
booms and busts, often alongside the Penta-
gon’s budget. In an era of declining resources 
shortly after the Cold War, the DoD made two 
game-changing revisions to how it would 
move forward. In 1993, Deputy Secretary of 
Defense William J. Perry convened leaders 
of the defense industry for a meeting that 
became known as the ‘Last Supper’ (Deutch 
2001). Perry signaled the end of an era of big 
spending, and encouraged defense contrac-
tors to consolidate in order to reduce their 
reliance on defense. Many acquisitions fol-
lowed between 1993 and 1998. Perry empha-
sized that the US Department of Defense 
would become one of many clients to civil-
ian producers. Suppliers were encouraged to 
pursue civilian applications to their systems, 
and not to depend upon defense contracts. 
Research and development investments did 
not appear to suffer from these changes. In 
fact, total R&D expenditure in the US hit a 
record high in 1997 at $205.7 billion, driven 
largely by corporations. Industry R&D moved 
from two-thirds of the national total in the 
1970s to nearly three-fourths in the late 
1990s (National Science Board 1998).
Secretary Perry’s other major policy change 
was to the DoD’s own procurement system. 
Rather than completing paperwork to jus-
tify purchases from civilian providers, it was 
from this point expected that commercial 
off-the-shelf (COTS) purchases would be the 
norm, and the DoD would now need paper-
work to justify any deviation from commer-
cially-available technology (New York Times 
1993; Constantine and Solak 2010). During 
the Cold War, the DoD strictly controlled sys-
tems development, but later gave prime con-
tractors responsibility to manage their tech-
nology supply chain. Reforms sought timely 
acquisition and use of commercial technol-
ogy, establishing the ability to purchase from 
commercial companies, to reduce the cost of 
doing business. The shift to the civilian sec-
tor was also a necessity given how informa-
tion infrastructure to power, communicate, 
and coordinate was replacing road and rail in 
Guttieri: Governance, Innovation, and Information and Communications 
Technology for Civil-Military Interactions
Art. 6, page 6 of 16
importance (Van Creveld 1991). The Penta-
gon also recognized that these technologies 
were becoming obsolete every 2–3 years. 
Given that the DoD’s timelines for develop-
ment of new systems was more like 10–15 
years, expecting a life-span of about 40 years, 
the Pentagon needed a way to keep pace 
(Reynolds 2006). 
Nearly 20 years after Perry’s tenure, much 
has changed in the ICT world. In 2010, 
President Barack Obama announced, ‘We’re 
expanding scientific collaboration with other 
countries and investing in game-changing 
science and technology to help spark historic 
leaps in development’ (The White House 
2012). Government programs like Patents 
for Humanity in 2012 began to provide 
incentives including accelerated Patent and 
Technology Office processes for innovators 
of technologies that are applied to humani-
tarian issues (Lanham 2013). Ashton Carter, 
currently President Obama’s Undersecretary 
for Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 
Logistics (AT&L) has commented on DoD reli-
ance on outside sources, observing that $400 
billion of the DoD’s $700 billion budget 
was ‘contracted out’ (2011). Meanwhile, pri-
vate sector initiatives such as Humanitarian 
Free and Open Source Software (HFOSS), 
SocialCoding4Good (SC4G), Benetech, Front-
lineSMS and the Guardian Project seek to 
draw upon technology innovator volunteers 
to address peace and humanitarian concerns 
(Nelson et al 2014). These innovators typi-
cally use open source software, and many are 
designed to match experts and problems in 
the humanitarian domain (Boss 2012). 
In sum, the spin-off era gave way to a new 
era of spin-in, shifting the center of gravity 
in many fields, including ICT innovation. In 
contrast to Cold War concerns about military 
influence in civilian science and industry, the 
US military became instead ‘a tentacle of the 
civilian technology market’ (Gombert 1998: 
19). The US military-industrial complex gen-
erated many modern technologies, but the 
military became increasingly dependent 
upon the civilian sector for growing propor-
tions of new technology. This shift was also 
apparent in the military’s approach to stabil-
ity operations in general.
Rethinking War
A second paradigm change, from the per-
spective of the military, was taking place in 
the nature of war itself. As the Cold War drew 
to a close, the international security environ-
ment was troubled by conflicts within states 
as much as between them. As civil conflicts, 
they were more akin to the small wars of 
America’s past experience in the Philippines 
and Cuba than the kind of major conven-
tional war the US military had prepared to 
fight against the Soviet Union. Fighting in 
small units and even face-to-face, accom-
panied by provision of humanitarian and 
civil administrative services, had become 
more common than large scale wars with 
armor and air power. The United Nations, 
with few exceptions, had historically con-
fined peacekeeping primarily to impartial, 
lightly-armed troops to observe negotiated 
settlements; this changed in the 1990s 
(Guttieri 2004). In order to stem the bleed-
ing in places like Mozambique, East Timor, 
Cambodia, Somalia and Bosnia, UN troops 
became more deeply involved in new ways 
with new missions. In 1992, UN Secretary-
General Boutros Boutros-Ghali introduced 
the concept of peacebuilding as a synergy 
across spheres of assistance – social, eco-
nomic, humanitarian, security, and political-
administrative to build and sustain peace 
(Boutros-Ghali 1992: 17). A larger number of 
civilian agencies became engaged in peace 
missions than ever before. Non-governmen-
tal organizations also grew in number and 
significance in conflict zones. 
The US military entered an era of stabil-
ity operations, peacebuilding, humanitar-
ian assistance, disaster relief, and preven-
tion. At the time of the 1995 peacekeeping 
mission in Bosnia, the US was reluctant to 
engage non-state actors, particularly after a 
failed humanitarian intervention in Soma-
lia two years before. Although many in the 
US military hoped that the US would avoid 
involvement, the Clinton Administration 
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committed to missions in both Bosnia and 
Kosovo alongside allies in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO). After terrorist 
attacks on the United States on September 
11, 2001, the Bush Administration invaded 
Afghanistan and Iraq, leading to large-scale 
nation-building projects. In the meanwhile, 
tsunamis, hurricanes, and earthquakes 
around the globe also increased demand for 
both military and civilian action. Not only 
did US forces need to communicate with 
one another, they found it vital to effectively 
share information with partners in the field 
of operations. 
In headquarters and in the field, many 
came to recognize that the ability to achieve 
mission objectives in Afghanistan and Iraq 
required civil-military cooperation. Many US 
military and policy leaders began to view sta-
bility operations as a ‘whole-of-government 
fight’ that would ‘leverage interagency, 
joint, and multinational cooperation,’ and 
‘enhance the capabilities and legitimacy of 
a host nation’ (Barno 2009). In 2005, the 
Department of Defense redefined stability 
operations as ‘military and civilian activities 
[emphasis added],’ and more importantly, as 
‘a core US military mission’ of equal impor-
tance to combat operations (DoD 2005). 
The document, Directive 3000.05, sought 
to clarify the mission of the military, and to 
provide a new understanding of its relation-
ship to civilian agencies. In December 2005, 
Bush signed National Security Presidential 
Directive 44 (NSPD 44), making the State 
Department the lead for coordinating US 
reconstruction and stabilization efforts (USG 
2005).7 These policy and doctrinal changes 
added to the imperative for the military to 
more effectively share information with 
other US government, Host Nation and inter-
national agencies, as well as non-governmen-
tal agencies in the field. 
The military’s Civil Affairs personnel not 
only support civilian agencies and nonmili-
tary stakeholders, they engage in collabora-
tive planning and coordination with them, 
typically through a Civil Military Operations 
Center (sometimes called a Humanitarian 
Operations or Humanitarian Assistance 
Center). The Army’s Civil Affairs Opera-
tion manual in 2006 added Civil Informa-
tion Management (CIM) as a core task for 
Civil Affairs (the others are Populace and 
Resources Control, Foreign Humanitarian 
Assistance, Nation Assistance and Support to 
Civil Authority) (United States Headquarters 
Department of the Army 2006: 1–1).8 The 
Civil Affairs Operations staff uses the CIM 
process to be sure that there is a common 
operating picture with the civil component. 
The 2011 Civil Affairs Operations field man-
ual defines CIM as follows:
CIM is the process whereby civil infor-
mation is collected, entered into a 
central database, and internally fused 
with the supported element, higher 
HQ, and other USG and DOD agen-
cies, IGOs, and NGOs…. Civil infor-
mation is information developed 
from data with relation to civil areas, 
structures, capabilities, organizations, 
people, and events within the civil 
component of the commander’s oper-
ational environment (Headquarters 
2011: 3–10). 
The CIM process is particularly important 
to the DoD capacity in ICT because the 
increased presence and importance of non-
military elements brings with it increased 
data, and increased information sharing 
requirements. At the same time, the various 
partners also bring ICT capabilities that add 
to the noise. The community of practice asso-
ciated with ICT innovation in stability opera-
tions emerged as a powerful force.
Communities of Practice
Several communities of practice spanning 
different agencies, specialty expertise, and 
events formed and were consequential for 
the evolution of ICT since the early 1990s. 
Bill Wood, for example, was a geographer 
who was enthusiastic about the potential 
of remote sensing and geographic informa-
tion in response to humanitarian crises, and 
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a government bureaucrat in position to do 
something about it. Wood helped to nego-
tiate the release of Shuttle Radar Topogra-
phy Mission data for humanitarian efforts 
– a long desired dream of the humanitar-
ian community. In 2002, while concurrently 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Analysis and 
Production at the Department of State, and 
Geographer of the United States, Wood 
established a Humanitarian Information 
Unit (HIU) within the Bureau of Intelligence 
and Research to help coordinate response 
to crises.9 The Department of State, as the 
USG clearinghouse for the release of data, 
has taken many experts seconded from other 
organizations such as the National Geospa-
tial Agency to build policies and systems in 
the HIU. After the US invaded Iraq, Wood 
helped to develop GIS-based tracking of 
reconstruction projects for the Department 
of Defense-led Coalition Provisional Author-
ity (AAG: 29). Wood’s biography encapsulates 
the important and non-obvious relationships 
among technological innovation, humanitar-
ian relief, and stability operations that have 
shaped military ICT in recent years.
Some years before the HIU was estab-
lished, a number of other humanitarian 
networks were making use of Internet por-
tals to support their work in the field. In 
1994, the Overseas Development Institute 
established the Humanitarian Practice Net-
work as ‘an independent forum for policy-
makers, practitioners and others working 
in or on the humanitarian sector to share 
and disseminate information analysis and 
experience, and to learn from it’ (Humani-
tarian Practice Unit). The United Nations 
Office for the Coordination of Humanitar-
ian Affairs (OCHA) established a digital 
information service, ReliefWeb in 1996. In 
1997, US Pacific Command was using web-
based technology for a Virtual Information 
Center to capture open source information. 
The Commander, Admiral Dennis C. Blair 
sought to apply the technology to security 
cooperation in the Pacific; he established the 
Asia-Pacific Area Network in 2000. Knowing 
that many non-governmental organizations 
are cautious about cooperation with the 
military, the portal was commercial, with a 
‘.org’ address, to promote information shar-
ing. However, the humanitarian community 
remained wary of military initiatives. The 
APAN site was slow to take off, until events 
brought the communities closer together.
Also in 2000, the US Navy conducted its 
major exercise in the Pacific involving more 
than 22,000 troops, 200 aircraft and 50 
ships. That year, at the initiative of Vice Adm. 
Dennis McGinn, Commander of the Third 
Fleet, it also included a component called 
Strong Angel that included top officials from 
the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, 
UNICEF and the UN World Food Programme. 
One public affairs officer noted, 
As much as it’s important to keep 
humanitarian operations neutral, the 
unfortunate reality in the post-Cold 
War world is that... we need each 
other more and more… We’re deal-
ing in [sic] countries where there’s 
no real authority and rule of law. 
In many cases, we couldn’t do our 
job without the military (quoted in 
(Essoyan 2000)). 
At that time, Dr. Linton Wells II served as 
Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Command, Control, Communica-
tion and Intelligence). For him, the role of 
ICT in the exercise, including communica-
tions, simultaneous translation, and David 
Warner’s crisis mapping was a harbinger of 
more integrated ICT in future.10 
In Afghanistan after 2001, the US-led coa-
lition sought ways to use ICT to stabilize a 
new post-Taliban government. The first order 
of business was to enable communications 
between the central government in Kabul 
and provincial governments. The US Agency 
for International Development (USAID) 
funded a radio network that provided that 
link until a nationwide ICT system could be 
established. The number of subscribers to 
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Afghan ICT grew ‘from essentially nothing to 
over 2.5 million… in four years’ (AEI: 28). But 
war zones were not the only arena of action.
In December 2004, an earthquake in Indo-
nesia caused a tsunami that affected the 
entire region. The event killed nearly three 
hundred thousand people and rendered five 
million homeless. The event also prompted 
further interactions between civil-military 
ICT communities, resulting in new link-
ages and overall closer working ties. PACOM 
responded quickly after the tsunami, but 
soon recognized that its traditional mili-
tary command structure did not accommo-
date the 90 NGOs also involved in the relief 
effort. PACOM turned to the APAN website, 
because it was unclassified and commercial. 
APAN ‘became a primary source for NGOs,’ 
one observer has written, ‘vital for involv-
ing nontraditional security partners, who 
are essential in humanitarian assistance 
operations that cover a broad area and cross 
national borders’ (Dorsett 2005). Websites of 
the DoD’s Center of Excellence in Disaster 
Management and Humanitarian Assistance, 
the UN Joint Logistics Center and USAID’s 
Office of Federal Disaster Assistance were 
among many sources of timely information 
and reach-back to experts for those respond-
ing to the crisis. USAID Disaster Assistance 
Response Teams sent information officers. 
The National Geospatial Intelligence Agency 
provided satellite imagery to give pictures 
of ports, communication networks, and the 
damaged areas, but commercial imagery was 
more easily and quickly shared. 
The Asian tsunami response showed that 
government bureaucracies were ‘the weakest 
link in the information chain’ (Martin 2007). 
Lin Wells, despite a high-level position in 
what was now called the Networks and 
Information Integration directorate of the 
DoD, met roadblocks as he sought to send 
ICT experts David Warner and Eric Rasmus-
sen to Southeast Asia.11 They finally arrived 
to find that Navy aircraft carriers were not 
sharing information with anyone who did 
not ask for it; the NGOs had not realized 
they needed to ask. They also learned that 
bandwidth for transmission was a problem, 
as was permission for US military helicop-
ters to share it with NGOs. As Acting Secre-
tary in 2004–5, Wells stood up Contingency 
Support and Migration Planning (CSMP) to 
address contingencies involving NGOs and 
to rationalize the use of ICT among the Coali-
tion Provisional Authority, US military, Iraqi 
government and private sector.
Citizen-led efforts gained steam, some of 
them inspired by government failures during 
the response to Hurricane Katrina. Lois Clark 
McCoy of the National Institute for Urban 
Search and Rescue (NIUSR) gathered a ‘who’s 
who’ of industry, military and government 
leaders in ICT for crisis response. NIUSR lists 
assisting ‘in the transfer of technology from 
federal labs and the military into the realm 
of domestic first responders and emergency 
managers’ among its contributions.12 
Dr. Wells notes that ‘for every innovator, 
there are bureaucratic obstructions’ (Wells 
2013). However, by 2009, Wells succeeded 
in changing the game, much as Perry had 
done some years before with a policy direc-
tive. Working as the Pentagon’s Chief Infor-
mation Officer, Wells introduced a new DoD 
policy to ‘resource ICT capabilities to share 
spectrum or bandwidth… provision ICT capa-
bilities and associated unclassified data and 
voice services for US task forces to support 
civil-military partners in stabilization and 
reconstruction, disaster relief, and humani-
tarian and civic assistance… enable connec-
tion to or provision of Internet service and 
voice capability’ to the extent authorized by 
law and ‘when it is determined to be in the 
best interest of the DoD mission, and when 
the access is not in conflict with host nation 
post, telephone, and telegraph ordinances’ 
(DoD 2009).
In the intervening years, many more dis-
asters struck the Pacific Region, and APAN 
supported responses.13 In 2010 APAN shifted 
regionally to support the response to the 
earthquake in Haiti. That year, APAN was 
renamed All Partners Access Network. In 
Guttieri: Governance, Innovation, and Information and Communications 
Technology for Civil-Military Interactions
Art. 6, page 10 of 16
2011, the DoD announced a new Unclassi-
fied Information Sharing Service as ‘an enter-
prise service centrally funded for all Com-
batant Commands (COCOMs) to use with 
mission partners in their respective areas 
of responsibility,’ using APAN as ‘a baseline’ 
(APAN date unknown).
The response to the earthquake in Haiti in 
2010 is widely discussed as a ‘new media suc-
cess story,’ fueled by citizen engagement. The 
Fletcher School at Tufts created a live crisis 
map. A report notes some of the innovations:
Relief workers crowd-sourced infor-
mation—and acted on it: reports of 
trapped people and medical emer-
gencies collected by text were plot-
ted on an online map then used by 
relief workers. In one example, the 
US Marines brought water and sani-
tation devices to a camp after receiv-
ing reports that drinking water was 
in short supply. SMS texts broadcast 
critical information to Haitians: cell 
phone companies, relief groups and 
media created and used the code 
4636 to send messages to tens of 
thousands about important public 
health issues. Volunteers created 
open-source maps as guides: using 
handheld GPS devices, volunteers cre-
ated up-to-date maps to help guide 
humanitarian groups and the public 
trying to navigate affected areas (Tar-
getted News Service 2011).
One of those deploying was David Kobia, 
a Kenyan software developer and founder 
of Ushahidi, a crisis mapping platform and 
open source software provider with origins 
in mapping the Kenyan election violence of 
2007. Kobia has described the creation of 
Ushahidi as, ‘a response to being helpless in 
other ways.’ Using web-enabled and mobile 
tools, Ushahidi revolutionized humanitar-
ian response. ‘The percentage of people that 
participate increases exponentially during a 
limited period of time,’ Kobia has observed, 
‘It is easier at that point to build the crowd-
source effort required for a crowdsourcing 
tool’ (Vericat 2010). The crowdsourcing of 
earthquake data analysis, for example, com-
plements the efforts of agencies like the Red 
Cross, who previously acted as the primary 
source of information.
Non-state volunteers as well as govern-
ment agencies quickly applied ICT tools to 
the challenges of analyzing, communicating, 
navigating and managing supply chains. New 
technology has not proved to be a panacea, 
and has sometimes complicated efforts, but 
the introduction of large-scale virtual civil-
ian response marked the beginning of some-
thing new. Many researchers today focus on 
social media ‘scraping,’ in which programs 
are written to analyze Twitter feeds to extract 
tidbits of data and separate noise from chat. 
The Crisis Mappers Standby Task Force that 
started with Haiti was renamed the Standby 
Volunteer Task Force (SBTF). The SBTF pro-
vided the United Nations Office for the Coor-
dination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 
support for a crisis in Libya in 2011: 
More than 150 digital volunteers 
maintained a live map over a four-
week activation period, collecting, 
geo-referencing, analysing and verify-
ing large volumes of crisis information 
related to these specific categories. 
The live–but private and password-
protected–map was launched within 
hours of the request. A public map 
was later made available, but without 
personal identifying information and 
with a 24-hour time delay for security 
reasons (IFRC 2013: 76).
In 2012, OCHA launched a Digital Humani-
tarian Network (DHN). Civil-military experi-
ments meanwhile continue, at places like 
Camp Roberts, in California, where the Har-
vard Humanitarian Initiative, Geeks Without 
Bounds, Random Hacks of Kindness, Open-
StreetMap, iRevolution.net and others try 
out new technologies. The RELIEF exercises, 
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led by the Naval Postgraduate School and 
sponsored by the Office of the Secretary of 
Defense (OSD) Advanced Technology and 
Logistics (AT&L) aim to ‘give industry a better 
idea of requirements and government peo-
ple a better idea about what is in the world of 
the possible’ (Buettner 2013). Ray Buettner, 
who now runs the program first developed 
by David Netzer, observes that ‘the collabora-
tion itself, rather than the tech, may be more 
important.’ Policies that were deliberated 
at Camp Roberts were applied when Hurri-
cane Sandy struck the US Eastern seaboard. 
OpenStreetMap and thousands of volunteers 
became involved. The Navy’s Civil Air Patrol 
high resolution imagery of the affected areas 
was imported into MapMill for the crowd to 
analyze and rate by triage as ‘OK,’ ‘not OK,’ or 
‘Bad’ to help guide FEMA deployment (iRev-
olution 2013). Likewise, the State Depart-
ment’s Humanitarian Information Unit, after 
deliberations at Camp Roberts, has been 
able to share information on the crisis of 
refugees and internally displaced from the 
2011-onward Syrian conflict.
Another key hub for the community of 
tech volunteers is San Diego State University, 
where Dr. Eric Frost and colleagues at the 
Immersive Visualization Center (VizCenter)14 
have convened a series of Humanitarian 
Assistance and Disaster Relief events. In 
2011, X24 Europe involved US government 
and approximately 90 other partners from 
non-governmental and private sector organi-
zations, including more than 49,000 people 
from 92 nations. The aim of the exercises is 
to demonstrate and test the use of ICT–low-
cost, off-the shelf, collaborative tools, to 
build ‘situational awareness.’
If these exercises are building a Common 
Operating Picture, it is not clear that the mili-
tary’s Civil Affairs community and the Civil 
Information Management (CIM) system are 
players in it. The CA community is ‘still build-
ing CIM data processing management [DPS],’ 
according to an officer involved, ‘CIMDPS 
genesis is continuity of data problem’ (Army 
CIM Officer 2013). The CIM initiative is still 
building acquisition processes that can cre-
ate the most possible options that connect 
to what people are actually using for their 
collection, coding, display and exchanges. 
The energy in the Army Civil Affairs world is 
a focus on data repository with legacy data 
that is sharable among the Army commu-
nication systems (classified/non-classified). 
The CIM effort today is focused on establish-
ing standards, only partially resolved by the 
National Information Exchange Model, an 
xml-based info exchange built within the 
US government. 
Internal coordination remains the imme-
diate problem for the Civil Affairs commu-
nity. They have yet to resolve conflicts within 
Army communication systems. They are still 
curating the data generated over ten years of 
war: ‘We need to link together so that we can 
see the bigger picture down the road and not 
put it in a desk drawer,’ one officer laments 
(Army CIM Officer 2013). As for what’s next 
on the horizon, it is to realize ‘what people 
use day-to-day for communications and data 
and bring it into our systems.’ That this gap 
persists, after the vast progress in the exer-
cise and field environments over time, dem-
onstrates the power of institutional barriers 
that remain. The US government is both 
open, in the general sponsorship of innova-
tion, and closed, in the ability to absorb rapid 
changes from the civilian realm. Given the 
turbulence of innovation, it is understand-
able that the military would seek to stabi-
lize its systems, but by the time programs 
of record are established, these may not be 
relevant to the new ICT environment.
Contingency, as many innovation research-
ers emphasize, is important. Public policy 
injects incentives and disincentives to the 
system that alter the trajectory of innovation 
and its diffusion. The process of testing and 
evaluation, exercises and field experience 
all contribute to coherence of community 
and momentum of technological system 
development. Events such as major disas-
ters punctuate the evolution of learning and 
coherence among the diverse community of 
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ICT practitioners. However, a more vigorous 
policy approach to ICT in stability operations 
appears needed for emerging capabilities to 
contribute to their potential.
Conclusion
This paper reports original and detailed data 
on the development of ICT in the modern 
period, with particular focus on the role of 
US government actors. This review high-
lights intended and unintended actions and 
impacts in stability operations–a field with 
a complex history (Guttieri 2014). In this 
research, I structure these data with concepts 
and arguments from innovation studies. The 
focus on system-builders and the evolution 
of large-scale technologies systems provides 
a way to thread together the variety of actors 
and expertise that have shaped ICT in differ-
ent historical and institutional moments. 
Social construction of technology offers 
another valuable perspective on the ecology 
of ICT innovations for stability operations. 
The social function of ICT innovation has 
grown at the same time that changes in the US 
(and global) paradigm of stability operations 
and peace building included greater roles for 
both military and civilian participants. The 
state played a role in shaping the ecology in 
two ways: first, the Pentagon shifted from 
spinning-off technology innovation to spin-
ning it in from the civilian sector. This shifted 
ICT invention, development, innovation, and 
overall division of labor. Second, the US mili-
tary shifted from a nearly-exclusive focus on 
major combat operations to engagement in 
stability operations. Together, these shifts 
opened the space for other actors in innova-
tion and in conflict zones. It created a distrib-
uted system for innovation across public and 
private sectors and activities related to stabil-
ity operations. 
As a major participant in stability opera-
tions, the US military continues to bring new 
tools and approaches. But other actors and 
activities matter in the stability operations 
realm of practice. A community of practice, 
as innovation research predicts, has been 
often key to ICT innovation and diffusion 
in stability operations. New technologies 
and approaches emerge in related realms 
of activity, such as disaster relief, that then 
make their way into core ICT programs and 
initiatives. Field exercises provide venues for 
development, testing, and sharing applica-
tions of new technology and policies that 
are lacking. Real world events have also trig-
gered action and development of greater 
coherence. As the operating space for these 
activities are so interconnected, innovations 
on one domain quickly migrate to other 
domains of humanitarian and military activi-
ties. Despite initiatives such as the military’s 
Civil Information Management and the 
State Department’s Humanitarian Informa-
tion Unit, information sharing gaps persist, 
largely for institutional reasons. The Army’s 
Civil Information Management initiative 
grapples with an expanded and changing ICT 
environment, aiming to seize opportunities 
and minimize the hazards of new ICT. 
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Notes
 1 The US Government manages a multi-
national military information network – 
The Coalition Enterprise Regional Infor-
mation Exchange System (CENTRIXS) 
– that provides multilevel secure virtual 
private networks (VPN) for collaboration 
with allies.
 2 Constant suggested that the study of con-
nections between ‘cultures of technol-
ogy, organizational cultures, and society 
at large’ be a subject of future research 
(Constant 1987: 234). 
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 3 Many of these began during World War II. 
General Eisenhower, as US Army Chief of 
Staff in 1946, formulated the doctrine of 
government-business partnership.
 4 These were MIT, Harvard, Brown, North-
western, Stanford, Cornell, Chicago and 
the University of Pennsylvania. 
 5 The Internet is a meta-network that 
includes subnetworks and applications 
(the World Wide Web, e-mail, etc.) The 
National Science Foundation network 
(NSFNET) replaced ARPANET in 1990. By 
1995, the Internet was fully established 
and NSFNET was decommissioned. 
 6 High-power radar, electronic counter-
measures and satellite technologies 
are some of the defense innovations In 
Silicon Valley, government funding sup-
ported university laboratory research that 
led to many of the crucial companies like 
Lockheed, Sylvania, and General Electric 
to the area to hire academic researchers 
and work again, under defense contracts. 
 7 The Department of State in 2004 estab-
lished an Office of the Coordinator for 
Reconstruction and Stabilization (S/CRS) 
to ‘lead and coordinate [US government] 
efforts to assist in stabilizing and recon-
structing countries or regions in, or in 
transition, from, conflict or civil strife.’ The 
S/CRS was absorbed into the Bureau of 
Conflict Stabilization Operations in 2012.
 8 This Field Manual was updated as FM3–
57 in 2011. 
 9 The HIU is in effect today a multi-agency 
organization with the DoD, the National 
Guard Association’s Humanitarian wing, 
and the President’s Emergency Program 
Response to AIDS in the health sector. The 
lead director is a senior civil servant from 
USAID. The HIU convenes conferences 
and responds to requests for geospatial 
products. Although it is non-deployable, 
the National Geospatial Agency (NOA) is 
in daily contact. The Department of State 
gives final approval for release of unclas-
sified imagery. See: https://hiu.state.gov/
Pages/Home.aspx. 
 10 See David Warner, AntZ: Complex Data 
Visualization at http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=gtSk9HFyiG8 As the Act-
ing Assistant Secretary and DoD Chief 
Information Officer from March 8, 2004, 
Dr. Wells remained engaged in the Strong 
Angel 2 and 3 exercises in 2004 and 2006 
that applied lessons of Afghanistan, Iraq, 
and Hurricane Katrina. Strong Angel 4 
focused on procedures for sharing infor-
mation outside the wire.
 11 Eric Rasmussen is a medical doctor with 
ties to the military, United Nations, and 
private sector networks such as InSTEDD, 
founded in 2006 from the TED Prize. 
 12 NIUSR is supported by a 2250-person 
Advisory Panel who contribute reports in 
addition to funding. See NIUSR ‘Who Are 
We?’ 
 13 2006: mudslides and typhoons in the 
Philippines, earthquake in Indonesia; 
2007 a tsunami in the Solomon Islands, 
cyclone in Bangladesh; 2008 Burma, 
typhoon in the Philippines; 2011 earth-
quake in Japan. https://community.apan.
org/hadr/p/hadr_history.aspx
 14 See http://vizcenter.net/x24/more.html. 
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